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ARGUMENT 
NO SPECIAL OR COMPELLING REASON FAVORS A 
GRANT OF CERTIORARI IN TFTS CASE 
Petitioner Call has failed to make any claim as to the 
applicability of any of t h<* considerations of Rule 46, U.R. App.P. 
Since subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) clearly do not apply, the 
only possible basis for a grant of certiorari is subparagraph (d) . 
Call has not demonstrated how the decision of the Court of Appeals 
involves an "important question of...federal law" which has not 
been decided by this Court. 
And he simply cannot, On,, the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
decision merely follows a long line of federal and state cases 
granting attorneys fees claims brought pursuant to 42 USC §1988. 
The present case does not present a fact pattern or particular 
circumstance which cries out for resolution by this Court at this 
time. Rather this area of the law should be allowed to develop in 
Utah and if and when there is a conflict between decisions of 
various panels of the Court of Appeals or there is some 
particularly compelling circumstance, this Court should resolve it 
then. 
Previous rulings of this court on 42 USC §1983 and §1988 cases 
have followed United States Supreme Court and other federal 
decisions in interpreting the law. See Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 
(Utah 1977) and In re Giles, 657 P.2d 285 (Utah 1982). The Court 
of Appeals decision below likewise followed the analysis of such 
cases as Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.992 (1984) and Maher v. Gagne, 
448 U.S.122 (1980) and need not be disturbed. See Lorenc v. Call, 
129 U.A.R. 34 at 36 (Utah App. 1990). 
Call argues that Lorenc is not a prevailing party and is thus 
not entitled to fees, "because the trial court denied her 
constitutional claim." It is correct that the trial court denied 
her constitutional claim as well as all of her other claims in 
granting summary judgment to Call. Call however ignores the fact 
that the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. 
The findings of the trial court are no longer of any force or 
effect. The appellate court, following traditional rules of 
analysis, felt no need to address Lorenc's constitutional claim as 
a substantive issue because the case was resolved on other grounds. 
This cannot and should not be construed as somehow breathing new 
life into the dead findings of the district court, yet this is what 
petitioner would have this court believe. 
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The Court of Appeals properly evaluated the constitutional 
claims in another context: Lorenc's claim for fees. In this 
context, the court found Lorenc had asserted a "substantial due 
process claim" and that her state law claims and the constitutional 
claims "arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact" 129 U.A.R. 
at 37, entitling her to fees to be determined upon remand. 
Call's argument that somehow different facts were involved in 
the constitutional and nonconstitutional claims is also specious. 
Lorenc's argument was a simple one: her rights were violated 
because Granite School District had a fee waiver policy that 
excluded her from a waiver because it was more restrictive than 
state regulations and she could not get a hearing to contest this. 
Whether evaluating the policy on its face or as applied, her one 
claim was that the policy was unconstitutional and prohibited by 
state law and regulations. The appellate court so held. 
Call has produced no authority to support his claim that fees 
should be denied under these circumstances. Two of the cases he 
cites, in fact, concluded that fees should be awarded because of 
the close connection between the various claims. See Texas State 
Teachers Association v. Garland Independent School District, 489 
US , 103 L.Ed 2d 866 (1989) and Lofft v. State Board of Higher 
Education, 89 Or. App. 614, 750 P.2d 515 (1988). 
Call's final argument seeks certiorari on the issue of a 
partial fee waiver. This issue is not so substantial as to demand 
a grant of certiorari by this Court. The appellate court merely 
accepted the language of the statute and state regulations 
3 
on their face and gave this language its most obvious 
interpretation—a student is either eligible for a waiver or not. 
CONCLUSION 
Call's petition should be rejected as it raises no serious 
basis for a grant of certiorari. 
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